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Abstract Only a few intertemporal optimal consumption and portfolio problems in partial
and general equilibrium can be solved explicitly. It is illustrated in the paper
that perturbation theory is a powerful tool for deriving approximate analytical
solutions for the desired optimal policies in problems where general state dy-
namics are admitted and a preference for robustness is present. Starting from the
perturbative approach proposed recently by Kogan and Uppal it is demonstrated
how robust equilibria for some formulations of a preference for robustness in the
literature can be solved. A crucial requirement for this approach is the existence
of a known functional form for the candidate model solutions, a condition which
is not satisfied by some models of a preference for robustness. For these cases,
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recent results by Trojani and Vanini can be used to obtain a perturbative solution
to the Bellman equation of the relevant benchmark model and to give some formal
conditions under which the perturbative solution converges to the correct one.
Keywords: Financial Equilibrium, Merton’s Model, Model Misspecification, Perturbation
Theory, Robust Decision Making.
1. Introduction
It is a well-known feature of financial models that only a few intertemporal
optimal portfolio problems on the single agent (partial equilibrium) level can
be solved explicitly. On the general equilibrium level even greater difficulties
arise, for instance when heterogeneous agents economies are considered.
The class of models that provide analytical solutions is characterized by as-
sumptions on agent’s utility functions (like for instant power utility), on the
dynamics for asset prices and state variables (as for example a geometric Brow-
nian motion price process), on the existence of intermediate consumption, and
on further aspects, like for example the presence of a preference for robustness
(cf. Anderson et al. (2000), AHS in the sequel). Typically, it is sufficient
to weaken one of these assumptions to loose closed form solutions. This is
due to the generic non-linear structure of the optimality conditions implied by
the given Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. As a consequence, exact
optimal solutions can be rarely obtained. However, both from a theoretical
and an applied point of view it is an important issue to characterize optimal
decision rules that arise when general dynamic laws for asset prices and state
variables are considered, and - for example - when some form of aversion to
model misspecification is taken into account by the agent’s optimal decisions.
The best that can be done when exact analytical solutions cannot be obtained
is to rely on approximation methods by which approximate analytical expres-
sions can be achieved. As for the natural sciences, it has been shown recently in
Kogan and Uppal (2000) within the setting of standard Merton’s (1969, 1971)
- type models, that perturbation theory is a powerful approximation method
for financial optimal decision making also. Clearly, perturbation theory is not
the only approximation technique that can be used in dynamic portfolio opti-
mization. A further one is the approach developed in Campbell (1993), which
is based on a log-linearization of the HJB equation1. A crucial difference be-
tween perturbation theory and the log-linearization approach is that the first
yields analytical solutions. Further, perturbative approaches allow for a higher
generality of the analysis, permitting rich investment set specifications and ad-
mitting a quite large spectrum of portfolio constraints. Finally, a last advantage
1See also Campbell and Viceira (1998, 1999) and Chako and Viceira (1999).
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is that they can be also used to solve general equilibria in heterogenous agents
economies where the opportunity set is endogenous rather than exogenously
given. On the other hand, for problems where the consumption to wealth ra-
tio is approximately constant (the assumption on which the log-linearizazion
approach is based) a log linearization of the HJB equation can produce more
precise approximations, as one would (at least) partly expect2.
The goal of this paper is to provide an introductory self-contained review
on perturbative approaches for solving continuous-time optimal portfolio prob-
lems and to illustrate their usefulness with a particular focus on robustness.
Control problems where the impact of an aversion to model misspecification
is described by a preference for robustness are a natural application field for
perturbation theory because there the implied value functions are characterized
by the solution of an HJB equation that is parameterized by a single parame-
ter. Indeed, formally many of these models are observationally equivalent to
stochastic differential utility (Duffie and Epstein (1992a, 1992b)). An open
question is how far perturbation theory can be applied to related approaches
like multiple priors recursive utility (Chen and Epstein (2000)) in cases where
value functions are characterized by the solution of some backward stochastic
differential equation.
Several formulations of a preference for robustness have been proposed re-
cently in the literature. In the sequel we will use the terminology ”Minimum
Entropy Robustness” (MER, AHS (2000)), ”Constrained Robustness” (CR,
AHS (1998) , Hansen et al. (2001)) and ”Homothetic Robustness” (HR, Maen-
hout (1999)) to distinguish the different definitions. All these approaches to
robustness are based on the idea that economic agents have an approximate
benchmark model in mind by which they try to describe the probabilistic fea-
tures of some underlying state variables processes, like for instance some set of
security price processes. At the same time, agents consider in their decisions
the possibility that the benchmark model could be bad specified. However,
not all possible misspecifications are treated as being equally relevant. On the
contrary, model deviations that are viewed as particularly different from the
given reference model (typically measured using relative entropy as a measure
of discrepancy) are penalized in their impact on the final decision. In all these
models, the magnitude of this penalization is parameterized by a parameter that
is interpreted as the strength of a preference for robustness3.
On a formal level, differences between the three above formulations of robust-
ness arise essentially through the way by which model deviations are penalized
2Cf. Kogan and Uppal (2000) for a numerical comparison of the accuracy of approximations based on
perturbation theory and the log-linearization technique within the model of Chacko and Viceira (1999).
3A related approach adopted by Uppal and Wang (2001) and allowing for differences in the degree of
robustness/model ambiguity of economic agents is not discussed further in this review.
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in optimal decision making. MER penalizes deviations proportionally to their
relative entropy with respect to the reference model, while CR puts a maximal
bound on the relative entropy of a relevant candidate misspecification. How-
ever, as enlightened by Hansen et. al. (2001) MER and CR are closely related
by the Lagrange Multiplier Theorem, even if they induce different preference
orders4. An important economic difference between the two formulations is
that CR depicts a form of first order risk aversion while MER (as HR) mimics
second order risk aversion. Further, CR is recursive in the sense of Epstein
and Chen (2000). Via statistical detection error probabilites AHS (2000) have
shown how to determine empirically plausible amounts of the robustness param-
eter for MER and CR, an important issue for applications. Finally, a weakness
of MER and CR appears to be their low analytical tractability. Indeed, so far
exact partial and general equilibria have been computed in closed form only for
the simplest constant opportunity set Merton (1969, 1971) model using a CR
formulation (see Trojani and Vanini (2001)). Numerical partial equilibrium so-
lutions for a stochastic opportunity set CR portfolio problem with predictability
are analyzed in Lei (2001). While perturbation theory can be applied to handle
also CR-based models (cf. for instance Trojani and Vanini (2001b)), we focus
for brevity in our exposition on MER where no exact analytical solutions exist
already for the simplest constant opportunity set model. Similarly to MER,
the HR formulation penalizes relative entropy of a model deviation. However,
in a way that is scaled by the current level of indirect utility and that makes
HR observationally equivalent to a well-known form of stochastic differential
utility5. A nice feature of the scaling factor defining HR is that it yields a
higher analytical tractability, because it imposes homogeneity of the implied
HJB equation. For instance, robust versions of models in Kim and Omberg
(1996) and Chacko Viceira (1999) can be solved explicitly, and the impact of a
robust motive for intertemporal hedging can be analyzed in detail.
In this review we demonstrate the usefulness of perturbation theory in deriv-
ing approximate analytical expressions for the optimal policies of intertemporal
consumption/portfolio problems where general state dynamics are admitted and
a preference for robustness is present. Starting from the perturbative approach
of Kogan and Uppal (2000), we explain how first order approximations for the
relevant optimal policies are obtained. That for we perturb the partial equi-
librium solution of a log utility investor who completely believes in the given
model dynamics (that is, an investor having no preference for robustness). In
general equilibrium, these approximations are derived by perturbing a bench-
4In fact, under regularity conditions the optimal controls implied by MER can be expressed in terms of the
solution to a corresponding CR problem, and vice versa.
5Maenhout (1999) shows that HR can be interpreted as increasing risk aversion, without changing preferences
for intertemporal substitution.
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mark economy where homogeneous log utility agents have no preference for
robustness. Hence, in our review we focus on applications and extensions of
Kogan and Uppal’s (2000) approach to situations where preferences for robust-
ness and the joint impact of aversion to risk and to model misspecification are
considered.
As mentioned, HR imposes homotheticity of the arising value function in the
corresponding robust control problem. Therefore, it allows for a direct pertur-
bative solution where Kogan and Uppal’s (2000) approach is applied simply by
expanding the optimal policies with respect to the risk aversion and the robust-
ness parameter (rather than only with respect to the first one). On the other hand,
a more indirect approach is needed for the minimum entropy situation, where
no exact explicit expressions for the optimal consumption and portfolio policies
are known, even for the simplest constant opportunity set case. For this case
a perturbative approximation to the HJB equation for the relevant benchmark
model has to be supplied first. This first step is achieved by results in Trojani and
Vanini (2001a). From an economic point of view this methodological exercise
yields analytical expressions for the impact of a preference for robustness on
partial and heterogeneous-agents general equilibria of models based on general
state dynamics and including intermediate consumption. Indeed, the analytical
approximations obtained apply to a broader class of robust dynamic models than
those analyzed previously in the literature. For HR they permit the analysis of
more general partial equilibria than those explicitly solved in Maenhout (1999)
and they are useful for the analysis of heterogeneous agents continuous-time
robust general equilibria, a topic that has not been largely investigated so far.
For MER perturbation theory provides some first analytical partial and general
equilibrium descriptions of the fundamental properties of AHS’s model.
A successful rigorous perturbation theory for general financial problems has
to fulfill (at least) the following requirements:
The errors implied by a given approximation method must be (formally)
quantifiable,
Convergence of perturbation theory up to all orders has to be (formally)
investigated in order to prove existence of a candidate solution.
This review focuses on an informal presentation of the basic ideas behind
perturbative approaches when applied to a few models of financial robust deci-
sion making. Therefore, a formal complete analysis of these issues is behind the
goal of this paper6. However, based on results in Trojani and Vanini (2001a) we
discuss briefly some of these aspects in Section 3.5 (Theorem 3 and 4), within
6General results on the convergence of the approximate solution to the true solution are not currently available;
for a discussion of issues related to convergence we refer to Judd (1996, 1998).
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the simplest (constant-opportunity-set) AHS model. For formal proofs of all
theorems and propositions in this review and for some more detailed economic
interpretation of robustness we refer to the original papers in the references.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 synthesizes the elegant and
ingenious approach of Kogan and Uppal (2000), while Section 3 introduces ro-
bustness into the analysis by describing first the direct extension of this method-
ology to HR. In a second step, we present the perturbative approach in Trojani
and Vanini (2001a) which provides a solution way also for the model by AHS
(2000). Section 4 presents perturbative solutions for a general equilibrium het-
erogeneous agents economy where risk aversion and preferences for robustness
interplay in determining assets prices; more details on this topic can be found
in Trojani and Vanini (2001b). Section 5 concludes and summarizes.
2. Standard Partial Equilibrium Problems
We start by presenting the basic ideas in Kogan and Uppal’s (2000) paper
that will be extended to take robustness into account.
2.1 Preferences and Objective Functions
Consider economic agents with constant relative risk aversion utility func-
tions u of current consumption Ct
uCt 
Cγt 1
γ  γ 1  (7.1)
For γ 0 the log utility case is obtained
logCt  limγ0
Cγt 1
γ  (7.2)
Our goal is to analyze the optimal intertemporal portfolio/consumption be-
haviour of investors with utilities of the form (7.1). For a given time preference
rate 0  ρ 1 (measuring depreciation of utility of consumption over time) we
consider infinite horizon problems with objective functions of the form
Vγ WX  E


∞
0
eρt
Cγt 1
γ dt

 (7.3)
Expectations in (7.3) are taken with respect to the joint law of two state variables
processes Wt Xt that are defined precisely below. Again, the corresponding
problem of a log-utility investor is obtained by letting γ 0.
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2.2 Opportunity Set
There are two assets, a risky and a riskless asset with price Pt and Bt at time
t, respectively, defined by the dynamics
dBt  rtBtdt  (7.4)
dPt  αtPtdt σtPtdZt  (7.5)
The drift and volatility αt  αXt and σt  σXt as well as the short rate
rt  rXt define the (stochastic) opportunity set of our agents, which is assumed
to be generated by a state variable process7 Xt with dynamics
dXt  ζXtdt ξXtdZXt  (7.6)
where Zt and

ZXt

are both standard Brownian motions in , having joint
covariation σZX Zdt  E

dZXt dZt

, and ζXt, ξXt . We further denote by
σXP  σξσZX Z the covariation of risky assets returns and state variables. Each
agent in the model allocates at each date t a fraction wt of current individual
wealth Wt to risky assets, yielding the individual current wealth dynamics
dWt  wtWt αt  rtrtWt Ctdt wtWtσtdZt  (7.7)
The next section introduces the standard consumption/portfolio optimization
problem of an investor in Merton’s (1969, 1971) model.
2.3 Single-Agent Optimization Problems
Let u be a utility function of the form (7.1). Each agent in the model solves
the intertemporal optimization problem
P :

J WX  supCw E 

∞
0 e
ρtuCtdt
s.t. (7.6) and (7.7)  (7.8)
Hence, preferences and price processes on risky assets are exogenously given
for the investor, who acts as a price taker optimizing lifetime expected utility
of consumption. Defining by c  CW the consumption to wealth ratio, the HJB
equation for the value function J in (P) is
0  sup
cw

W cγ1
γ ρJ AW J AXJ wWσXP
∂2J
∂W∂X

 (7.9)
7Prominent examples of such state variables in the context of optimal portfolio choice are economic variables
describing the evolution of some potential risk factors.
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where AW ,AX , are the generators of the wealth and state dynamics (7.7), (7.6),
respectively,
AW  rwα r cW
∂
∂W 
1
2
w2σ2W 2
∂2
∂W 2  (7.10)
AX  ζ ∂∂X 
1
2
ξ2 ∂
2
∂X2  (7.11)
Clearly, appropriate boundary conditions on the value function have to be im-
posed in order to obtain well-defined solutions to (7.9). However, (P) can in
principle be solved by the following procedure:
First, by formally differentiating (7.9), the optimal policy candidates cw
are derived. At this stage, they are both functions of the unknown solution
J.
Second, insert the optimal policy candidates into the HJB equation (7.9).
This leads to a non-linear partial differential equation for J (excluding
trivial cases).
Third, the partial differential equation thereby obtained has to be solved
in order to obtain the value function solution J and the implied optimal
rules from the first step.
As a matter of fact, the last step in this procedure can be carried-out explicitly
only for a very limited class of problems8.
2.4 Perturbative Solutions Approach
The crucial idea behind the perturbative approach in Kogan and Uppal (2000)
for computing the optimal policies implied by (7.9) is as follows. Suppose first
a constant opportunity set. Homogeneity of the utility function (7.1) and of the
generator for the wealth-dynamics (7.7) implies that the functional form
JW  
1
ρ

egγW
γ
1
γ  (7.12)
8A second remark concerns the implicit differentiability assumptions. Suppose a sufficiently smooth candi-
date solution was found using the formal approach described above. Then, using the verification theorem, one
can prove rigorously that the candidate solution is indeed a solution. If the value function is not differentiable,
the formal approach is no longer meaningful. If this happens, one has to consider the viscosity solutions
approach. This case arises for example in financial applications where transaction costs are considered.
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is appropriate for solving (7.9)9. When the opportunity set is stochastic, homo-
geneity suggests a ”state dependent” functional form for (7.12) given by
JWX 
1
ρ

egγXW
γ
1
γ  (7.13)
where g is a function thas has to be determined. If we seek for an exact solution
of (7.8), this functional form has to be inserted in the HJB equation (7.9) in order
to start the formal procedure outlined above. However, the implied differential
equation for the unknown function g is most of the times not solvable explicitly.
Since gγX can be not computed generally in closed form, Kogan and Uppal
(2000) propose to approximate the implied optimal policies by expanding g in
powers of a suitable parameter. In the present setup, a natural choice for this
parameter is the risk aversion index γ
gγX  g0X γg1XOγ2  (7.14)
Notice that by construction10 g0 is implied by the value function solution for
the stochastic opportunity set problem (7.8) of a log-utility agent
JlogWX 
1
ρlnW g0X  (7.15)
At this point, not much seems to be gained. Even worse: it seems that we
now have to determine two functions g0, g1, instead of a single function g.
However, the key point for the analysis to follow is that g0 can be often obtained
analytically from the value function solution of a log utility agent11, while g1
is of second order in γ and therefore can be neglected in first order analysis.
To see this, differentiate first the HJB equation (7.9) using the functional form
9Indeed, it can be easily verified (cf. also Merton (1969, 1971)) that (7.12) solves (7.9) for an appropriate
contant gγ.
10This is easily implied by the limit:
1
ρ

egγXW
γ
1
γ 
1
ρ lnW g0X 
as γ 0.
11Which is typically easier to compute than that of the original (power utility) problem.
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(7.13). This gives the policy candidates12
cX 

1
ρe
γgγX

1
γ1
 (7.16)
wX 
1
1 γ
α r
σ2

γ
1 γ
∂gγX
∂X
σXP
σ2
 (7.17)
Further, insert (7.14) in (7.16), (7.17), and expand the implied expressions up
to first order in γ. It then follows
cX  ρ1 γg0X lnρOγ2  (7.18)
wX 
α r
σ2
1 γ γ∂g0X∂X
σPX
σ2
Oγ2  (7.19)
This shows that g1 does not contribute to the optimal policies up to first order
in γ.
As a consequence, it is sufficient to compute g0 in order to determine (7.18),
(7.19), completely. Since this function is fully determined by the solution of the
log-utility version of (P), having determined the value function JlogWX for
this problem already gives g0 (the last unknown in the approach) from (7.15).
Formally, Jlog is defined by
JlogWX 

supCt wt E 

∞
0 e
ρt logCtdt
s.t. (76) and (77) 
Using the perturbed policies (7.18), (7.19), for a log utility agent (γ  0), to-
gether with the solution to the linear wealth dynamics (7.7) it then follows
JlogWX  E


∞
0
eρt lnρWt dt

 E


∞
0
eρt ln

ρW exp

 t
0
Ψsds
 t
0
ΦsdZs

dt

where Ψs   1ρ  rs 
1
2
	
αsrs
σs

2
and Φs  αsrsσs . A final partial integration
identifies g0 as
g0X  lnρ1E


∞
0
eρt

rt 
1
2

αt  rt
σt
2

dt

 (7.20)
12Notice that c and w are wealth independent. The term
1
1 γ
σXP
σ2
∂gγX
∂X
in (7.17) is a standard intertemporal hedging demand by which agents hedge against changes in the stochastic
opportunity set.
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After having specified the state variables and risky asset price dynamics (7.6),
(7.5), explicitly, it is then possible to evaluate (7.20) in some cases analytically.
Summarizing, the above perturbative approach for computing the desired
optimal policies works as follows.
1 Identify a set of parameters that parameterize the problems under scrutiny
(the parameter γ in the above discussion) and a specific parameter value
for which the value function solution is known explicitly (the parameter
value γ 0 in the above discussion).
2 Determine a functional form for the solution candidate (expression (7.13)
above) such that to first order only functions of the solvable benchmark
model enter in the optimality conditions (the function g0 above).
3 Compute the optimal policies from the optimality conditions for the given
problem using the functional form of step 2 (policies (7.16) and (7.17)).
4 Expand the implied optimal policies to first order, determine the value
function for the explicitly solvable model and compute the corresponding
expectations (expressions (7.18), (7.19), (7.20)).
Hence, two requisites are necessary for the above procedure:
Existence of an explicitly solvable model within the given model param-
eterization,
Existence of a functional form for the parameterized candidate model
solutions.
These restrictions can be rather severe. However, in some cases analytical
solutions are obtained for problems where otherwise only numerical solutions
are available.
3. Robust Partial Equilibrium Problems
We now consider situations where economic agents have some doubts on the
specification (7.5), (7.6), for asset prices and state variables dynamics. They
rather treat model (7.5), (7.6) as an approximate description of a reality where
model deviations can always be present. In the sequel we will therefore call
(7.5), (7.6) the ”reference model” of our robust agents.
Given this cautious perception of the reality, the goal in robust portfo-
lio/consumption decision making is to develop policies that perform well not
only at the given reference model but also across a set of competing relevant
specifications. This leads naturally to embed robust portfolio selection into
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some kind of max-min expected utility theory (cf. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) using optimization objectives of the form
inf
QQ
EQ


∞
0
eρt
Cγt 1
γ dt

 (7.21)
These criteria extend (7.3) to consider situations where model uncertainty in the
form of a set Q of canditate relevant models (containing the reference model
probability) is present. Criteria like (7.21) appear as objective function also in
recursive multiple priors utility (cf. Chen and Epstein (2000)) and robust control
theory. These two approaches are based on a similar motivation but differ cru-
cially in the way by which Q is specified and in the corresponding behavioural
implications13. In the first one, Q is constructed explicitly through the defi-
nition of an appropriate (rectangular) set of density generators. In the second
approach Q is parameterized typically only implicitly, through some positive
penalty parameter that penalizes a statistical perturbation of the reference model
probability implied by (7.5), (7.6); see below. This parameter parameterizes
in a parsimonious way a (one parameter) set of model misspecifications with
quite rich alternative dynamics. As a consequence, robust control problems
are particulartly adequate for a perturbative solution approach that perturbs the
standard (non robust) model solution with respect to this parameter.
This review focuses on perturbative solutions of HJB equations implied by
some robust control problems that have been recently formulated for a few
models of robust intertemporal consumption/portfolio choice. Some specific
objects and definitions used in robust control theory are now shortly introduced.
More details are given in Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), AHS (2000) and
Hansen et al. (2001) for the basic theory, and Maenhout (1999) and Trojani and
Vanini (2001) for the more specific optimal consumption-portfolio perspective.
3.1 Model Misspecifications and Measures of Model
Discrepancy
For a positive random variable ν such that E ν  1 denote by ςtt0 the
martingale process obtained by setting ςt : E νFt, the conditional expecta-
tion of ν conditionally on the informationFt generated by the current wealth and
state variables dynamics up to time t. By the Markov property we write without
loss of generality ςt  ςtWt Xt. Contaminations of the dynamics (7.5), (7.6)
are described by a family Tνt t0 of conditional expectation operators defined
13While the preferences implied by multiple priors recursive utility are recursive those behind robust control
theory are not in the usual sense. They justify a recursive solution by relating a solution of a date zero
commitment game to a Markov perfect game in which the decision of both agents are functions of the
underlying state vector. See Chen and Epstein (2000), Epstein and Schneider (2001, 2001a) and Hansen et
al. (2001) for more details on this point.
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by the distortion law
T νt φ WX  E ςtφWt Xt W0 WX0  X   (7.22)
for suitable functions φ : 2  . Hence, a contaminating model ν consists
simply of an absolutely continuous change of measure with respect to the initial
reference model probability. By Girsanov Theorem the class of dynamic mis-
specifications induced by model contaminations of the form (7.22) are therefore
mispecifications of the drift in (7.5), (7.6)14.
Naturally, model misspecifications that are a priori less easily detectable
should induce a more cautious behaviour of a robust economic agent. As
mentioned in the introduction, this aspect is taken into account in robust control
theory making use of relative entropy as a measure of discrepancy between the
reference model and a model contamination15. Given a candidate contaminated
model ν, relative entropy Itν at time t is defined by
It ν WX  E ςt  log ςtW0 WX0  X  (7.23)
It is not a metric. However, it measures the discrepancy of the finite dimensional
densities under scrutiny by the information inequality (cf. for instance White
(1996))16.
3.2 Preferences for Robustness and Objective Functions
Preferences for robustness are modelled by introducing a pessimistic view
in the computation of the current certainty equivalent of future indirect utility
of consumption of a robust agent. Pessimism is embodied by a max-min ex-
pected utility approach where a malevolent player (nature, say) selects a worst
case model νwc from the set of model misspecifications (7.22) that a robust
decision maker considers as relevant. The set of misspecifications relevant to
a robust decision maker is constrained by a (possibly state dependent) penal-
ization parameter that penalizes misspecifications ν with ”particularly high”
relative entropy (7.23).
Specifically, let ψ :    be a positively valued function and define
It ν  ∂∂t It ν. We consider worst case (robust) objective functions (com-
14Under regularity conditions, explicit expressions for the drift under the misspecified model are obtained
by representing the process ςtt0 as an exponential martingale.
15This incorporates an asymmetric treatment which embodyies the idea that a robust decision maker tenden-
tially believes to the given reference model.
16Further It ν can be interpreted as the mean surprise experienced (over the time period 0 t ) when believing
that (7.5), (7.6), describe the model dynamics and being informed that in fact these are described by a
contaminated model ν; cf. Renyi (1961, 1971) for a deeper discussion of this point. Finally note that
Itν  0 for all t  0 if and only if ν is equal to 1 everywhere.
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pare also with (7.3)) of the form
Vγϑ WX  inf
ν

Eν


∞
0
exp ρt

uCt
1
ψt
It ν

dt


(7.24)
where
ψt  ψ

Vγϑ Wt Xt


and expectations Eν  are with respect to the joint law for wealth and state
variables induced by a model contamination ν through (7.5), (7.6) and (7.22).
The infimum with respect to ν in (7.24) determines a worst case model νwc and a
corresponding worst case (pessimistic) expected utility of lifetime consumption.
In this formulation ψt depicts a (possibly state dependent) preference for
robustness. Choosing
ψt  ϑ  ϑ 0  (7.25)
yields the minimum-entropy objective function
Vγϑ WX  inf
ν

Eν


∞
0
eρt

uCt
1
ϑ I

t ν

dt

 (7.26)
in AHS (2000). In this case preferences for robustness are state independent.
The higher ϑ the stronger the preference for robustness, respectively the higher
the aversion to model misspecification. Indeed, when ϑ ∞ the solution of
the infimization in (7.26) is a ”worst case model” (νwc say) yielding the lowest
conditional expectation on future indirect utility over all possible absolutely
continuous contaminations (7.22) of the given reference model. On the other
hand, when ϑ 0 this yields a worst case model with lowest possible relative
entropy. That is, a model with transition densities that are equal to that of the
given reference model. Hence, (7.26) covers the objective function (7.3) as a
particular case which arises as the limit case ϑ 0. As discussed by Hansen
et. al (2001) the preferences represented by criteria of the type (7.26) are
recursive in a non-standard sense if a Bellman-Isaacs condition is satisfied17.
This condition defines a Bellman equation for a two-player zero-sum game
(between a robust agent and nature, say) in which both players decide at time
0 and recursively and it is needed to relate solutions of a date zero commitment
two-agents game to a Markov perfect game where the decision rules of both
agents are functions of the underlying state vector. For criteria of the type
17Cf. also Fleming and Souganidis (1989).
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(7.26) the Bellman-Isaacs condition is equivalent to finding a solution for the
HJB equation (7.38) below in this review18.
A scaled version of (7.26) is obtained by setting:
ψt 
ϑ
γVγϑ Wt Xt 1ρ
 ϑ 0  (7.27)
This formulation of a preference for robustness arises naturally if homogeneity
of the HJB equation for optimum consumption-investment problems with power
utility functions is imposed. At variance with the minimum entropy case above,
the homogeneity of the implied HJB equation permits to determine analytical
solutions for the value function of virtually all optimum portfolio problems
where explicit solutions for the standard (expected utility) formulation exist.
Therefore, HR is by construction analytically more tractable than MER. The
implied objective function is given by
Vγϑ WX  inf
ν

Eν


∞
0
eρt

uCt
γVγϑ 1ρ
ϑ I

t ν

dt


(7.28)
Here, a preference for robustness is state-dependent since it is inversely related
to the current level of lifetime indirect utility in the given state of the world.
Conditionally on the realized state, the interpretation of the parameter ϑ is, on
a pure formal level, the same as for the non homothetic case above. Finally,
notice that while the interpretation of the parameter ϑ in (7.28) is natural based
on the given functional form and compared to (7.26), a more detailed analysis
of the preference structure implied by objectives of the type (7.28) has not been
pursued yet in the literature (to our knowledge). Specifically, a discussion of
the sense by which these preferences can be recursive - in a similar vain as for
instance in Hansen et al. (2001) - is absent19.
18Notice that in general the value function implied by these stochastic control problems will satisfy the
given HJB equation in a weak viscosity sense (cf. Fleming and Souganidis (1989)). Existence of a classical
solution will typically require specific arguments and model assumptions, as for instance for the MER
solutions obtained below in Theorem 3 and 4.
19A starting point to this problem could be to formulate a type of Bellman-Isaacs condition for the HR
formulation and to analyze if it is sufficient to relate solutions of a date zero commitment two-agents game
to a Markov perfect game in which the decision rules of both agents are functions of the underlying state
vector. However, a detailed discussion of these aspects is clearly behind the goal of this review.
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3.3 Robust Single-Agent Optimization Problems
Each agent solves a worst case (robust) optimization problem of the form
(cf. also problem (P))

J WX  supCw infν

Eν
	

∞
0 e
ρt
	
uCt 1ψJ I

t ν


dt


s.t. (7.6) and (7.7)

(7.29)
Hence, the HJB characterization of the value function J in continuous time
robust models reads
0  sup
cw
inf
ν0

Wcγ1
γ ρJ A
ν
W J AνXJ
wWσXP
∂2J
∂W∂X 
1
ψJ  I

t ν

 (7.30)
where AνW ,AνX are the generators for the asset prices and state variables dynam-
ics under the law induced by (7.22)20. This equation represents the zero-sum
game between a malevolent player (selecting the worst case model νwc) and a
robust agent (choosing optimal consumption and investment rules C, w) who
is rationally taking into account the possibility that the first agent will indeed
hurt her by selecting a least favourable model from the set of relevant model
misspecifications.
Calculating AνW  AνX , (cf. also AHS (2000)) and solving for the implied
worst case model νwc, the HJB equation (7.30) is equivalent to the single agent
HJB (cf. also (7.9)):
0  sup
cw

cW γ1
γ ρJ AW J AXJ wWσXP
∂2J
∂W∂X

ψJ
2


wWσ
∂J
∂W
2


ξ ∂J∂X
2
wWσXP
∂J
∂W
∂J
∂X


(7.31)
Given a set of appropriate boundary conditions, this equation can be in principle
solved using the procedure outlined at the end of Section 2.3. However, this is
again explicitly possible only for a very limited number of special cases. We
therefore rely on perturbation theory to derive in the next sections approximate
solutions for the implied optimal rules.
20Remember that by Girsanov Theorem the given model contaminations simply modify the drift of the joint
process for asset prices and state variables.
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3.4 Perturbative Solutions Approach: Homothetic
Preferences for Robustness
Due to the homogeneity of the implied value function Kogan and Uppal’s
(2000) approach can be applied to solving the HR case with only a few slight
modifications. Indeed, homogeneity suggests that a functional form of the type
(7.13) should be appropriate to develop a perturbative approach similar to that
used for the standard (non robust) case. However, in the present situation the
class of problems under scrutiny is parameterized by two parameters (γ and ϑ)
rather than by only one as in non robust problems. Therefore, the function g in
(7.13) has to depend in the robust setting on both γ and ϑ.
The HJB equation (7.31) for the HR formulation reads (using subscripts to
denote partial derivatives with respect to the relevant argument)
0  sup
cw

cW γ1
γ ρJ wWα rrW  cW JW

1
2
w2W 2σ2

JWW 
ϑJ2W
γJ  1ρ

ζJX

1
2
ξ2

JXX 
ϑJ2X
γJ  1ρ

wWσXP

JXW 
ϑJW JX
γJ  1ρ


To start the perturbative approach, the homogeneity of J implies the following
functional form for a candidate solution
J WX 
1
ρ 

egγϑXW
γ
1
γ  (7.32)
As usual the exact optimal policies are obtained by the first order conditions
implied by the corresponding HJB equation, using (7.32)
cWX 

eγgγϑX
ρ

1
γ1
 (7.33)
wWX 
1
1 ϑγ1


1
1 γ
α r
σ2

γϑ
1 γ
∂gγϑX
∂X 
σXP
σ2


(7.34)
In the second step, g is expanded up to first order in the risk aversion parameter
γ and the robustness parameter ϑ
gX  g0 X γg1 Xϑg2 XO
	
γϑ2


 (7.35)
124 COMPUTATIONAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
g0 X is again obtained from the value function of an agent with logarithmic
utility (γ 0) and no preference for robustness (ϑ 0)21. Hence, the model
that is being perturbed is the same as in the standard (non robust) case discussed
above. The next statement summarizes the result relevant for our exposition.
Theorem 2. The asymptotic expansions for the optimal policies of an homo-
thetically robust agent are:
cWX  ρ1 γg0 X lnρO
	
γϑ2


 (7.36)
wWX 
α r
σ2
1 γϑγϑ ∂g0 X∂X 
σXP
σ2
O
	
γϑ2


 (7.37)
Notice that again only g0 appears in the optimal rules. Hence, the choice of
the functional form (7.32) to develop a perturbative approach turns out to be
successful.
3.5 Perturbative Solutions Approach: Minimum Entropy
Preferences for Robustness
The HJB equation (7.31) for the minimum entropy formulation reads:
0  sup
cw

cW γ1
γ ρJwW α rrW  cW JW

1
2
w2W 2σ2JWW ϑ  J2W ζJX  12ξ
2
JXX ϑJ2X
wWσXPJXW ϑJW JX

 (7.38)
with optimal robust policies
c 
JW 
1
γ1
W
 (7.39)
w  
JW
	
1ϑ  J
2
W
JWW


WJWW

α r
σ2

JWX
JW
σXP
σ2
ϑJX
σXP
σ2


(7.40)
21This is again easily implied by the limit:
1
ρ

egγϑXW
γ
1
γ 
1
ρ lnW g0X 
as γϑ 0.
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that follow as usual.
At variance with the HR case where explicit solutions are known for a few
models, for this nonlinear partial differential equation no explicit solutions are
currently known when γ  0, already in the simplest constant opportunity set
situation22. Specifically, the difficulty in finding a solution to this problem
derives from the fact that a candidate solution has to be nonhomogeneous in
current wealth Wt , implying that the functional form (7.32) is not adequate for
the setting of this section. To obtain a functional form on which Kogan and Up-
pal’s (2000) approach can be applied in the minimum entropy situation we start
from results in Trojani and Vanini (2001a) which characterize the perturbative
solution of the HJB equation (7.38) for the simplest constant-opportunity-set
AHS (2000) model. Specifically, let
αt  α  rt  r  σt  σ  (7.41)
be constant. This gives a constant-opportunity set version of the HJB equation
(7.38) with candidate solution J, say. The perturbative solution approach to
this problem is based on a power series of the form:
J W  
∞
∑
i0
ϑi
i! J
i
W   (7.42)
with a hierarchy

Ji

i of functions that are determined recursively starting
from the zero order term J0, the well-known solution in a standard (non robust)
Merton’s-type model. Theorem 1 in Trojani and Vanini (2001a) shows that each
function in the hierarchy (7.42) has to be a solution to a second order Euler
equation with an homogenous part that is invariant with respect to the stage i
of the hierarchy. Moreover, computing the first order term J1 explicitly the
following result is obtained23.
Theorem 3. If a classical solution for the robust HJB equation (7.38) under
assumption (7.41) and under appropriate boundary conditions exists, it is given
by
J  J0ϑJ1O

ϑ2

 (7.43)
with
J1 W  
egγ0W 2γ
C 
22For the log utility case the solution is a logarithmic function of wealth (as in the non robust case); cf.
Schroder and Skiadas (1999).
23Clearly, in order to obtain the result in Theorem 3 appropriate boundary conditions have to be imposed.
As a non-standard boundary condition we require that for any order i the candidate solution converges as
γ 0 to the known explicit solution of the robust problem (7.38), (7.41), when agents are of the logarithmic
utility type.
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where
C  ρ2 2γ2γδ11δ2  δ1 
a1
a2
 δ2 
ρ
a2

a1 

eγgγ0
ρ

1
γ1
 r
α r2
γ1σ2 
gγ0  ln ρ
γ1
γ ln

γ
1 γ

1
γ 
1
2
α r2
σ2 γ1ρ 
r
ρ


a2 
α r2
2γ12σ2

A main open question is wether the series (7.42) converges. Sufficient con-
ditions for that are implied by Theorem 4 in Trojani and Vanini (2001a); these
conditions are summarized by the next theorem.
Theorem 4. If
(i) a1  0  (ii) γ 23  (iii)
1
2

3 a1
a2


γ
1 γ 
the power series (7.42) converges on compact subsets of 0∞.
Notice, that while condition (ii) is a pure technical one, condition (i) implies
that for γ 0 one should have ρ	 r. This further constraint is implicit in the
conditions of Theorem 4.
Given the above functional form, the wealth-inhomogeneity of the value
function for the MER case is up to ϑ-first order proportional to J1, a function
behaving like W2γ. Therefore, in a state dependent situation a natural functional
form for the solution to (7.38) is
J WX 
1
ρ


egγXW
γ
1
γ ϑg2 γXW
2γ

O

ϑ2

 (7.44)
where
gγX  g0 X γg1 XO

γ2

 (7.45)
g2 γX  g2 X γg21 XO

γ2

 (7.46)
for some g21 X. Expanding the optimal rules (7.39), (7.40) and using the
functional form (7.44) together with (7.35) finally gives the desired approximate
policies.
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Theorem 5. The asymptotic expansions for the optimal policies of a minimum
entropy robust agent are:
cWX  ρ1 γg0 X lnρO
	
γϑ2


 (7.47)
wWX 
α r
σ2

1 γ ϑρ



γ ϑρ
 ∂g0 X
∂X 
σXP
σ2
O
	
γϑ2


 (7.48)
Again, only g0 appears in these optimal rules. Hence, the choice of the
functional form (7.44) to develop a perturbative approach turns out to successful.
3.6 Qualitative Discussion of the Robust Optimal Policies
The optimal policies for the homothetic and minimum entropy formulation
are of the form:
cWX  ρ1 γg0 X lnρO
	
γϑ2


 (7.49)
wWX  α r
σ2
1 γϑγϑ ∂g0 X∂X 
σXP
σ2
O
	
γϑ2


 (7.50)
where ϑ  ϑ, ϑρ , in the HR and the MER case, respectively. We remark
the following distinguishing features of these first order asymptotics. First, the
functional form for optimum consumption is exactly the same as in the standard
non robust situation (cf. (7.18)). Hence, to γϑ-first order a preference
for robustness does not affect optimum consumption planes directly. Second,
optimal allocations to risky assets are altered when a preference for robustness
is present. Indeed, a higher effective risk aversion amounting to
1 γϑ 
is obtained, compared to the standard expected utility situation. This enhanced
risk aversion affects both the myopic and the intertemporal hedging demands
for risky assets. Notice that a non standard hedging component arises in (7.50),
which is purely driven by a preference for robustness. Indeed, the term
ϑ ∂g0 X∂X
σXP
σ2

is a first order asymptotic for a hedging demand caused by a concern of a ro-
bust agent for the quadratic variation of the underlying value function J. This
term disappears only when ϑ  0, that is in the absence of a preference for
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robustness. Indeed, in the case γ 0 (that is a log utility investor) this hedging
component is still non-zero. Hence, stochastic opportunity sets generate non
myopic investment policies for log utility agents when robustness is present.
This point is important for the way of developing our asymptotic general equi-
librium analysis below. The sensitivity of the optimal risky allocations with
respect to the robustness and risk aversion parameters can be positive or nega-
tive, depending on the sign of ∂g0X∂X 
σXP
σ2
. Finally, notice that at variance with
the HR case in the MER formulation effective risk aversion is related to the
time preference parameter ρ.
4. Robust General Equilibrium Problems
While several authors have already dealt with the existence and the character-
ization of heterogeneous agents equilibria in standard (non robust) economies
(see for instance Duffie and Huang (1985), Duffie and Zame (1989), Duffie et
al. (1994), Dumas (1989), Karatzas et al. (1990) and Wang (1996)) only a
few of them have derived quantitative or qualitative predictions for the relevant
entities in a continuous time setting. Moreover, when quantitative predictions
have been derived either they were computed using numerical methods (Du-
mas (1989)) or they where obtained in closed form only for particular values
of the model parameters (Wang (1996)). Using perturbation theory, Kogan and
Uppal (2000) have been able to compute analytically the general equilibria of
heterogenous non robust production and exchage economies where in excess
incomplete markets and borrowing constraints are allowed for.
To our knowledge only two papers have so far considered heterogeneous
agents general equilibria in continuous-time economies where model misspec-
ification is taken into account in optimal decision making. Epstein and Miao
(2001) have described in closed form equilibria for a complete model based
on recursive multiple priors utility using a martingale approach24. That model
focus on heterogeneities in aversions to (model) ambiguity and leaves outside
heterogenities in agent’s attitutes to risk. On the other hand, Trojani and Vanini
(2001b) have solved by a perturbative approach a robust version of Dumas
(1989) and Wang (1996) models where heterogeneities arise both in aversions
to risk and preferences for robustness25 . In this section we illustrate this method-
ology by computing the relevant quantities in a robust version of the complete
heterogenous-agents production economy of26 Dumas (1989).
24Since the martingale approach is based on market completeness, extensions of this model to allow for
incomplete markets are not immediate.
25As for standard non-robust economies the perturbative approach permits the analysis of incomplete markets
equilibria.
26A further reference relevant for this section is Anderson (1998).
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4.1 The General Equilibrium Economy
There are two groups of agents in the economy with utilities of current
consumption given by
uCt 
Cγt 1
γ  u1

C1t

 log

C1t

 γ 1  (7.51)
preferences for homothetic/minimum entropy robustness27 ϑ 0, ϑ1  0, and
identic time preferences ρ ρ1. There further exists a single constant returns
to scale technology yielding the dynamics
dSt 

αSt Ct C1t

dt σStdZt 
for the aggregate capital stock, where α, σ  0. The risky asset is a stock on
the production technology with cumulative return process Pt given by
dPt  αPtdt σPtdZt 
The number of shares in this economy is equal to the aggregate capital stock.
The riskless asset is a short term bond with price dynamics
dBt  rtBtdt 
where rt is a (possibly stochastic) interest rate that has to be determined in
equilibrium. The equilibrium definition used is given next.
Definition We call a process

St rt wt w1t Ct C1t

such that:
The individual portfolio and consumption rules wt w1t Ct C1t are optimal
to first order, i.e they satisfy (7.49) and (7.50),
Financial markets clear, i.e. aggregate wealth Wt W 1t is completely
invested in the given production technology:
wtWt w1t W 1t
Wt W 1t
 1  (7.52)
a robust equilibrium.
Remark that in this definition of equilibrium feed-backs between the sets of
model specifications relevant to each single (robust and non robust) agent in
the economy are excluded. Implicitly, it is assumed that the set of relevant
27For simplicity of notation just set ϑ ϑρ , for some ϑ  0 in the MER case.
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model misspecifications is determined by agent specific characteristics (the pa-
rameter ϑ depicting a preference for robustness) and hence it is not determined
endogenously by the equilibrium. We have basically two reasons to make use
of this assumption. First, we are not focusing on modelling game theoretical
issues where each agent is strategically planning to develop an optimal strategy,
given that he knows the set of model specifications relevant to her counterpart.
We are rather interested in equilibria were groups of ”beliefs-takers” develop
optimal consumption/portfolio plans in the presence of misspecifications and
where heterogenous aversions to risk and preferences for robustness interplay
in determining asset prices. Second, from a more methodological point of view
introducing feed-backs between agents beliefs necessitates to solve some kind
of multi-agents stochastic game where each robust agent interplays with the
malevolent player (the nature) and with each other agent in the economy in
determining the optimal policy of a max-min optimization problem. Solving
this problem is an highly nontrivial task; it is an open question how far pertur-
bation theory can be applied to compute analytical approximate solutions for
this kind of problems. A second important remark on the above equilibrium
definition is related to the question of why in the above economy agents do
have different model beliefs (that is different perceptions of the relevant model
misspecifications) despite observing a common price process. Formal continu-
ous time models that describe learning and that allow for the presence of model
ambiguity have not been largely developed yet28. However, the LLN result in
Marinacci (1999) for beliefs represented by a set of priors suggests that model
ambiguity will not disappear even asymptotically when agents learn about the
underlying data generating process. Indeed, in this setting the connection be-
tween empirical frequencies and asymptotic beliefs turns out to be weakened
to a degree that depends on the extent of diversity in prior beliefs. Therefore,
it is very well plausible that agents with different prior beliefs will still have
posterior different beliefs, even if they observe the same price process29.
4.2 Perturbative Solutions Approach
In general equilibrium the function g0 in (7.49), (7.50) is now endogenous to
the economy, i.e. it depends on γ and ϑ. However, it can be further expanded in
a neighbourhood of the representative agent value function of an homogeneous
production economy with log utility non-robust investors (γ ϑ ϑ1  0):
g0 X  g00 X γg01 Xϑg02 XO
	
γϑ2



28Work in progress related to this topic is Epstein and Schneider (2001a).
29Cf. also the discussion in Chen and Epstein (2000), Section 1.3.
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implying
cWX  ρ1 γg00 X ln ρO
	
γϑ2



c1 WX  ρ 
wWX  α r
σ2
1 γϑγϑ ∂g00 X∂X 
σXP
σ2
O
	
γϑ2



w1 WX 
α r
σ2

To characterize these rules completely we need to determine r and g00. Notice
that since g00 is completely determined by the value function of a representative
log utility agent in the given production economy, it is a constant. For this
benchmark economy it follows in equilibrium thatασ2 is the implied constant
interest rate. As a consequence, (7.20) gives
g00  ln ρ1
ασ22
ρ  (7.53)
The equilibrium interest rate r in now completely determined by the market
clearing condition (7.52), that can be expressed as
wtωt w
1
t 1ωt  1 
with ωt  WtWtW 1t the cross-sectional wealth distribution in the given economy.
This gives the last result of the paper.
Theorem 6. In the above production economy equilibrium interest rates are
given by
rt  ασ
2
σ2 γϑωt O
	
γϑ2


 (7.54)
The individual equilibrium optimal policies are
c1t  ρ  (7.55)
ct  ρ γ

ασ22ρ

O
	
γϑ2


 (7.56)
w1t  1 γϑωt O
	
γϑ2


 (7.57)
wt  1γϑ1ωtO
	
γϑ2


 (7.58)
Finally, the equilibrium cross-sectional wealth and capital stock dynamics are
given by
dωt  γωt 1ωt

ασ22ρ

dt γϑωt 1ωtσdZt
O
	
γϑ2



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and
dSt 

αρ γ

ασ22ρ

ωt

Stdt σStdZt O
	
γϑ2



4.3 Qualitative Discussion of the Equilibrium Variables
In the sequel we illustrate for brevity the implications of Theorem 5 in the
case γ ϑ.
The asymptotics for the optimal policies in Proposition 6 show a basic dif-
ference between the pure risk averse (ϑ 0) and the robust (ϑ 0) solutions.
Indeed, we see that while risk aversion affects directly all decision variables of
the investor, the robustness parameter influences directly only optimal invest-
ment to risky assets. However, robustness still affects optimum consumption
indirectly, through the altered equilibrium process for cross-sectional wealth.
Further, robustness tends to reduce heterogeneities in the individual portfolio
positions. Note that (as in Kogan and Uppal (2000)) no equilibrium intertem-
poral hedging position arises because the variance of the only relevant state
variables to the investors in this economy (namelyωt ) is of order O
	
γϑ2


.
Moreover, robustness lowers equilibrium interest rates (by given cross-sectional
wealth distribution ωt). The arising equilibrium interest rate is between that of
an heterogeneous standard economy where no preference for robustness arises
and an heterogeneous robust economy with homogeneous log utility investors.
ασ2 1ϑωt rt  ασ2 1 γωt 
Compared to standard economies this lower interest rate reflects a lower demand
for riskless assets (by given cross sectional wealth distribution ωt ) caused by the
higher ”effective” risk aversion 1γϑ in the partial equilibrium asymptotics
(7.50) for the optimal portfolio strategy. In fact, the equilibrium open interest
in the bond market is:
OIt 
1
2

1wt ωt 

1w1t


1ωt

 γϑωt 1ωt 
and is lower than in a non-robust economy.
Finally, robustness affects the cross sectional wealth distribution, through a
reduction of the volatility
γϑωt 1ωtσ 
of ωt, but does not alter the corresponding drift which is given by
γωt 1ωt

α
σ2
2
ρ


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This is because the impact of the optimal portfolio policies on the drift of ωt
is of order no less than two. In particular, (since equilibrium interest rates are
linearly linked to ωt ) lower volatilities of equilibrium interest rates, given by
σ3 γϑ2ωt 1ωt 
are obtained. As in standard economies, the highest interest rate volatilities are
observed when aggregate wealth is evenly distributed across agents. Finally,
an important difference between HR and MER is that in the latter case equilib-
rium interest rates, optimal portfolios and the volatily of cross-sectional wealth
depend on time preferences.
5. Conclusions
We demonstrated the usefulness of perturbation theory in deriving approxi-
mate analytical expressions for the optimal policies of intertemporal consump-
tion/portfolio problems where general state dynamics are admitted and a pref-
erence for robustness is present. We illustrated the methodology proposed in
Kogan and Uppal (2000) within several economic settings, starting from partial
equilibrium standard expected utility economies to general equilibrium models
where general stochastic opportunity sets are allowed for and an aversion to
model misspecification is present. The approach was applicable to a large class
of models and the implied equilibrium characterizations were particularly sim-
ple. Moreover, an even larger class of models than those discussed here could
be easily handled by the methodology. For instance, robust intertemporal con-
sumption/portfolio problems with transaction costs can be solved in the same
general vain of Kogan and Uppal (2000) or models using further formulations
of a preference for robustness (specifically, a constrained formulation) can be
analyzed analytically (see again Trojani and Vanini (2001b)).
Kogan and Uppal (2000) methodology is based essentially on two crucial
assumptions:
Knowledge of the explicit solution of a benchmark model within the given
parameterization,
Existence of an appropriate functional form for a candidate value function
solution.
Since for the MER formulation no benchmark exact explicit solution has
been derived yet, we used results on perturbative solutions of HJB equations in
non-homothetic robust decision making (Trojani and Vanini (2001 a)) to guess
the appropriate functional form for a candidate value function. After this pre-
liminary step, Kogan and Uppal (2000) approach could be applied successfully
also to this case without further significant difficulties.
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